USA v. Germaine Hall by unknown
2020 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
7-31-2020 
USA v. Germaine Hall 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2020 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Germaine Hall" (2020). 2020 Decisions. 730. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2020/730 
This July is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 






UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 




UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 




    Appellant 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
of the Virgin Islands 
Criminal No. 3-17-cr-00019-005 
District Court Judge: Honorable Curtis V. Gomez 
____________________________________ 
 
Argued: December 10, 2019 
 
Before:  SMITH, Chief Judge, McKEE, and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges 
 








* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
 2
McKee, Circuit Judge. 
Germaine Hall appeals the judgment of sentence that was imposed following his 
conviction for various charges related to his conspiracy to distribute a controlled 
substance.  He challenges a jury’s verdict1 for conspiracy to possess cocaine with the 
intent to distribute and the reasonableness of his 160-month sentence. He further argues 
that prosecutorial misconduct, the erroneous admission of hearsay testimony, and the 
District Court’s decision to allow the parties to stipulate to the admission of evidence 
with an interrupted chain of custody affected the fairness of the proceedings thus denying 
his right to due process.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.2 
I. 
Hall’s first challenge concerns the denial of his renewed Rule 29 motion.  After 
several counts of the multi-count superseding indictment against Hall were dismissed and 
he was acquitted by the jury of another count, Hall sought a Rule 29 Judgment of 
Acquittal claiming that the government failed to prove the existence of an underlying 
agreement or unity of purpose between him and his alleged conspirators.  After 
conducting a plenary review of the record and applying the same standard as the District 
Court, we will affirm.3   
 
1 Hall proceeded to trial alone after the district court granted co-defendant Gerald 
Mercer’s severance motion.  App. 6, 22-23. 
2 The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231, which grants to district 
courts “original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of all offenses against 
the laws of the United States.” This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
3 United States v. Freeman, 763 F.3d 322, 343 (3d Cir. 2014). 
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The evidence presented of Hall’s involvement with his co-conspirators to possess 
and distribute cocaine rested upon the testimony of cooperating witness, Kishaun Carey.4  
He testified that he was contacted by co-conspirator Craig Richardson when there was a 
shipment ready for pick up and distribution.5  Richardson would sometimes direct him to 
pick up a shipment from co-conspirator Makimba Barry in West Palm Beach, Florida.6  
On other occasions Richardson would tell Carey to pick up the shipment from Hall, in 
Orlando, Florida.7  Carey testified to picking up three shipments from Hall between late 
2015 and May 2016 at Richardson’s direction.8  Carey did not have any other contact 
with Hall.9  After he sold the cocaine, Carey contacted Richardson to find out who would 
be picking up the proceeds.10  Either co-conspirator Jamal Haynes or Barry came to 
collect.11   
Viewing this testimony and all reasonable inferences therefrom in a light most 
favorable to the government, we must affirm the District Court.  As we have stated many 
 
4 A second witness, Kinia Blyden, testified to transporting cocaine from St. Thomas to 
Florida in June 2016.  App. 292.  She testified that co-conspirator Jamal Haynes picked 
her up from the airport when she arrived in Florida and drove her to a residence where 
she left the drugs, packaged in a “clear seal,” with Hall.  App. 295.  As the jury acquitted 
Hall of a substantive count concerning this interaction charged at Count Four, we will not 
consider this testimony in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting Hall’s 
conspiracy charge. 
5 App. 261-262, 269. 
6 App. 262, 264. 
7 App. 265, 267. 
8 App. 268, 271. 
9 App. 280. 
10 App. 264. 
11 App. 270. 
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times before, “a conspiracy may be proven entirely by circumstantial evidence.”12  
Moreover, the government need not prove “each defendant knew all of the conspiracy’s 
details, goals, or other participants” to demonstrate a unity of purpose, intent to achieve a 
common goal, and agreement to work towards that goal.13  The fair inferences from 
Carey’s interactions and connections with Richardson, Hall, Haynes and Barry 
demonstrate Hall’s knowledge of the drug conspiracy and its aim.14  Carey’s interactions 
with Hall cannot be reduced down to a mere “buyer-seller relationship” as Richardson 
directed Carey as to when to get shipments from Hall and then Richardson directed other 
individuals to coordinate payments with Carey.  Additionally, the length of Carey’s 
affiliation with Richardson, Hall, Barry, and Haynes evidences his comprehension of the 
conspiracy’s scope and serves as additional circumstantial knowledge of Hall’s 
membership.15 
Hall next argues that there was a material variance between the single conspiracy 
charged in the indictment and the evidence presented at trial.  As Hall failed to raise his 
variance argument with the District Court, we review it for plain error.16  Hall again bases 
his claim on the government’s alleged failure to put forth evidence from which a jury 
 
12 United States v. Claxton, 685 F.3d 300, 309 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. 
Wexler, 838 F.2d 88, 90 (3d Cir. 1988)). 
13 United States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). 
14 Claxton, 685 F.3d at 310 (inferring similar knowledge from circumstantial evidence). 
15 United States v. Pressler, 256 F.3d 144, 152 (3d Cir. 2001). 
16 See United States v. Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 531 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Daraio, 445 
F.3d 253, 259 (3d Cir. 2006). 
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could infer his knowledge of, and desire to participate in the charged conspiracy.  For the 
reasons stated above, we find no error here, plain or otherwise.   
When reviewing the record in a light most favorable to the government and 
assessing whether there was a variance, we consider: (1) “whether there was a common 
goal among the conspirators;” (2) “whether the agreement contemplated bringing to pass 
a continuous result that will not continue without the continuous cooperation of the 
conspirators;” and (3) “the extent to which the participants overlap in the various 
dealings.”17  In assessing whether the conspirators shared a common goal we consider the 
“underlying purpose of the alleged criminal activity” in broad terms.18  Thus, framing the 
underlying purpose as a desire to obtain and distribute cocaine for profit, we find 
sufficient evidence that Hall had a unity of purpose with his alleged co-conspirators, 
intent to possess and distribute cocaine, and an agreement to work with them in 
furtherance of that goal.19   
Third, Hall challenges the reasonableness of his sentence, arguing that the District 
Court erroneously factored into his sentence amounts of cocaine not attributable to him.  
As Hall concedes he failed to preserve his sentencing argument in the District Court,20 we 
review it for plain error.21  Hall fails to meet his burden of plain error.  He attempts to 
 
17 United States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 287 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). 
18 United States v. Rigas, 605 F.3d 194, 214 (3d Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
19 United States v. Pressler, 256 F.3d 144, 147 (3d Cir. 2001) (describing sufficient 
evidence to evince a conspiracy). 
20 Appellant’s Br. at 1, 16. 
21 United States v. Stinson, 734 F.3d 180, 186 (3d Cir. 2013). 
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limit his exposure to only the amount Carey testified to obtaining from him.  However, as 
there was sufficient evidence supporting the jury’s verdict that Hall was a member of a 
conspiracy, the District Court appropriately considered the relevant conduct of Hall and 
his co-conspirators when fashioning his sentence.22  As testified to by his co-conspirators, 
that conduct included the possession and distribution of 50 to 150 kilograms of cocaine.  
Accordingly, the Court finds no plain error with this finding nor does it find the resulting 
sentence to be unreasonable.23  
Hall next claims that the District Court permitted prosecutorial misconduct by way 
of leading questions and efforts to introduce inadmissible evidence.  As Hall did not 
object to any of the Government’s questions, his claims are reviewable only for plain 
error.24  His claims are completely without merit.  The court consistently and properly 
policed the conduct of the prosecution during the trial with reprimands when the 
questioning became leading on direct, side bars to ensure witnesses would be providing 
relevant testimony, questioning regarding the admissibility of proffered exhibits, and 
consistent balancing of the prosecutor’s questions under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence.25  Hall also claims that Carey perjured himself by testifying that he saw Hall 
 
22 Gibbs, 190 F.3d at 214. 
23 Id.; see also United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261 (2005) (discussing the 
benchmark for a reasonable sentence). 
24 See Gov’t of V.I. v. Mills, 821 F.3d 448, 456 (3d Cir. 2016) (“Where, as here, a defendant did 
not object to prosecutorial misconduct at trial, we review for plain error.”); United States v. 
Fulton, 837 F.3d 281, 302 (3d Cir. 2016) (questions that misstate the evidence are reviewed for 
plain error.) 
25 See, e.g., App. 108, 152, 204-06, 208, 375. 
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with fourteen kilograms of cocaine and the prosecution failed to correct that testimony.  
We disagree.  As Hall concedes, the Government’s failure to correct perjured testimony 
is reversible only if, among other things, (1) the witness actually committed perjury and 
(2) “there is a reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the 
verdict.”26  “Perjury” is “false testimony concerning a material matter with the willful 
intent to provide false testimony, rather than as a result of confusion, mistake, or faulty 
memory.”27  Hall has not shown that Carey held this intent.28  In addition, at trial, Carey 
did not attribute to Hall any drug amounts beyond three deliveries totaling eight or 
nine kilograms.29  Thus, there is no reasonable likelihood that Carey’s testimony affected 
the verdict.  Further, Hall elicited Carey’s statement about the “additional cocaine” as 
impeachment on a collateral matter.  Although Carey denied the statement, in light of the 
other evidence of Hall’s guilt, it is not likely that the statement had any effect on the 
verdict. 
Defendant’s remaining arguments regarding the admission of stipulated evidence 
and his co-conspirator’s statements are also meritless.  Hall’s counsel stipulated to certain 
evidence with Hall’s approval, and by stipulating to the chain-of-custody evidence Hall 
 
26 Appellant’s Br. at 25 (quoting United States v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137, 183 (3d Cir. 2008)); 
see also United States v. John-Baptiste, 747 F.3d 186, 210 (3d Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). 
27 Hoffecker, 530 F.3d at 183.  
28 See Appellant’s Br. at 25-26. 
29 See App. 268.  
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waived his rights to appeal the issue.30  Additionally, the admissions of co-conspirators 
that are made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy are not hearsay.31 
II. 
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
 
30 See Gov’t. of V.I. v. Rosa, 399 F.3d 283, 290-91 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[A]n explicit agreement or 
stipulation constitutes a waiver of rights if the defendant was aware of the right.”); see also 
United States v. Ceballos, 789 F.3d 607, 613 (5th Cir. 2015) (“[B]ecause we conclude that [the 
defendant] waived her right of confrontation through her counsel’s unchallenged stipulation to 
the admission of the testimony, her claim is entirely unreviewable.” (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
31 Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E); Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 182 (1987), 
superseded by statute on other grounds United States v. Bobb, 471 F.3d 491, 498 (3d Cir. 
2006). 
